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  This paper examines a set of possible proxy measures for weak or 
fragile states, here referred to as ’difficult environments’. Difficult 
environments are defined as those areas where the state is unable or 
unwilling to harness domestic and international resources effectively for 
poverty reduction.  
 
  Based on our definition of difficult environments and on a set of 
methodological criteria, the paper suggests the best parsimonious 
proxy measures to quantify capacity and willingness.  We do not claim 
to develop complex measures similar to the governance measures and 
more comprehensive capacity measures currently being developed by 
numerous governmental organizations, NGOs and Universities. 
 
  Capacity to engage in partnerships for poverty reduction is best 
measured, for our purposes by simply constructed indicators consisting 
of objective variables that have been previously assessed in academic 
literature to be proxy factors or causal factors for one or several of the 
basic aspects of state capacity. The paper finds that indicators 
combining Immunisation rates, and Female/ Male Life Expectancy, 
Public Health Spending as a percentage of Tax per GDP, and the % of 
Female Government Ministers are good proxies for willingness to 
reduce poverty because of reasonable availability of the indicators, the 
differentiation they afford between countries and the sensitivity of the 
factor to policy changes.  
 
  The measurement approach presented here is intended as a tool to 
inform decision-making on responses to difficult environments for 
better poverty reduction outcomes. Such measures are not intended to 
form a list of difficult environments. Other diagnostic tools will be just as 
important, particularly context-specific political analysis. 
 
Working Paper for Discussion Only – NOT UK GOVERNMENT POLICY    3Measuring Capacity and Willingness in Difficult Environments    
 
I.  Introduction: What are we trying to measure? 
 
1.  What are difficult environments and why are they important to poverty 
reduction and the achievement of MDGs? Difficult environments, also 
referred to as fragile states, are generally the countries with the lowest 
levels of life expectancy, literacy and access to basic services, and with 
the highest levels of infant and maternal mortality, crime and corruption. 
Since many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people live in 
these states, they are of vital importance in reducing poverty
1. The 
problem of difficult environments, although understood here to be centred 
on state effectiveness, is not only due to the weakness of aid recipient 
states, but also to the policies and actions of donors, and global factors 
such as trade and economic shocks. Indeed, one of the main challenges 
to measuring fragile states is to come up with indicators that, to some 
degree, reflect its relational aspects.   
 
Working Definition of Difficult Environments
2 
 
Those areas where the state is unable or unwilling to harness domestic and 





                                           
We aim to measure capacity and political willingness to use resources for 
poverty reduction. We are not assessing performance, conflict or 
developmental outcomes per se, but to what extent a country has the 
capacity and its political leaders the willingness to improve the well being 
of the population. Given the wide range of policy concerns, diverse state 
experience, and multiple definitions that are currently in use for fragile 
states, the purpose of this paper is to set out an approach to measuring 
state fragility that has a high degree of analytical utility for the challenges 
of development and poverty reduction. The key issue is measuring those 
aspects of state capacity and government policy that are vital for basic 
development effectiveness. 
 
What this paper will do: use existing measures to come up with two 
indexes for capacity and willingness. Capacity and willingness represent 
the lowest common denominator for a minimally effective state on many 
dimensions (security, law enforcement, economic policy, service delivery). 
Both capacity and will are required for development effectiveness. Areas 
where the state lacks the jurisdiction, authority, or capacity to exercise 
effective control and implement programmes are clearly areas where a 
poverty reduction partnership is difficult for donors and other actors. 
Similarly a government that is not committed to sound regulatory policies 
and programmes aimed at poverty reduction may lack the political will to 
use resources effectively for development. Yet when the notions of 
capacity and willingness are used as criteria for programming, their 
 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of fragile states for the achievement of the 
MDGs, please see: Branchflower (2004). 
2 See Moreno Torres, M and M. Anderson (2004). 
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features become much less clear. This paper aims to provide indicators for 
each concept for a quantitative approximation to state effectiveness, to be 







The primary objective is coming up with two indexes that can contribute to 
better DFID responses, both in our analysis and in our programmes. 
Regular monitoring of country situations should enable context-specific 
responses and a better sense of trends. The measures proposed here will 
provide information, but will not determine – on their own – the list of 
countries considered difficult environments. Due to comparability problems 
between data for different countries, these measures should not be taken 
as an index of state weakness. 
 
II.  The measurement challenge 
 
Measuring both state capacity and willingness is a difficult task and 
ultimately a question of political judgement on a case-by-case basis given 
there are no internationally agreed criteria by which to measure state 
performance that are applied consistently. The basic problems of 
subjectivity and political partiality, or judging them by our standards, will 
not disappear and we need to be careful to take this into account.  In other 
words, how much can countries diverge from a median measure before 
they are considered difficult environments? Should we have a cut-off point 
or should we work with a continuum where the threshold for capacity and 
willingness moves depending on a variety of additional factors? 
 
The problem of causality: many academics and policy-makers agree that 
higher levels of income are preferred to lower levels of income. A better 
educated population is better for long-term development. But do these two 
factors have a causal relation? Does a better educated population lead to 
higher levels of income or do high income levels cause more education? 
Understanding the causal relationships between social, political, economic 
and security realms is a challenge and measures of symptoms are not 
measures of causes.  
 
State capacity versus country capacity. Our approach underscores the 
importance of state capacity: the role of institutions, in particular 
governance institutions (understood as basic functions), that secure 
property from private and public predation, and form the basis for 
development. Underlying any discussion of long-term good performers 
must be a discussion of the governance structure of society. We are 
therefore attempting to measure state capacity but recognize the 
importance of country capacity, which includes non-state institutions such 
as civil society and the market. 
 
Willingness as a normative dimension to state effectiveness. Whereas 
state capacity is a politically neutral concept that describes the 
effectiveness of public institutions (debates around the scope of a state 
can, however, be ideological), the notion of willingness carries a normative 
weight in that it assesses the quality of policies to reduce poverty.  






                                           
The challenge of good data: Good data, especially for developing 
countries, does not exist for many indicators of a country’s ‘goodness.’ For 
example, nearly one-third of the countries that are eligible for the MCA do 
not have data for each of the 16 indicators. Additionally, there are several 
methodological difficulties when using governance data. Many indicators 
are highly collinear; certain criteria may appear in more than one indicator; 
governance data tend to measure performance without assessing 
institutional arrangements or processes; and assigning a relative 
measurement weight to willingness and capacity can be difficult: should it 
be country specific or standard for all? 
 
 In terms of a process for coming up with indicators of capacity and 
willingness, this exercise started by building on the conceptual framework 
derived from the definition in Text Box 1 (and Working Paper 1), setting a 
universe of countries, and choosing proxies for the two key variables. First, 
the challenge of conceptual clarity. This measuring exercise assesses 
essential functions that affect a state’s capacity to mobilise and use 
resources for poverty reduction. If these essential features are missing or 
are met to a limited extent, then the capacity of the state to engage with 
others to reduce poverty will be seriously affected. They include the 
foundations of state authority, the allocation of power, the economic 
competence and the capacity for implementation. When assessing the 
willingness of a state to engage in partnerships for poverty reduction, we 




 Setting the universe of countries: we are assessing all countries that are 
eligible for borrowing from the World Bank as of July 2004. This includes 
146 countries that borrow from the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development as well as those that borrow from the IBRD’s 
concessional arm, the International Development Association (see Annex 
2 for a complete list). 
 
 Choosing proxies. There were several questions to address, including to 
what extent we should look for outcome versus process proxies and 
absolute levels versus rate of change. Also, how to deal with data gaps? A 
detailed explanation on how we went about aggregating proxies and the 
challenge of normalisation features in Annex 2. Proxies were not weighted, 
but each of the variables were standardised if they were not already 
continuous between 0 and 1. The general criteria for selecting proxies 
include: 
 
a)  We use proxies based on their simplicity, data availability, and the 
extent to which the measurements are good proxies (in that they 
represent what we’re trying to measure, based on tested hypotheses in 
the literature).   
 
 
3 See Moreno Torres, M. and M. Anderson (2004) for a more detailed discussion of these. 
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b)  In order to alleviate the problems discussed above, we measure the 
willingness and capacity of a country’s poverty reduction on two 
indexes made up of several indicators. Our definition emphasizes the 
role of state capacity with a theoretical basis rather than just 
correlations. Thus, difficult environments have limited state capacity 
and poor governance institutions. 
 
c)  Getting the right mixture of the so-called “hard indicators”, such as 
resources and outputs, with “soft indicators” on impacts and outcomes. 
The project is a nascent effort to find simple indicators that will show 
change over time (see figure 1).  It does not attempt to replicate 
extensive, ongoing studies by governmental organizations, universities 
and NGO’s concerning governance. 
 
d) Operationally-relevant  measures  should also be institutionally specific 
so that reformers know which institutions to reform and how to do so.  
The idea of simple indicators stems from this aim to identify where 
change can best effect progress. 
 
e)  Minimising subjective and non-transparent evaluations. Using datasets 
that are publicly available, data that are the most reliable, and have the 
greatest coverage. 
 






















































Figure 1: State Capacity and Willingness 
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 What are we trying to find proxies for? When assessing the developmental 
capacity of the state, we are looking to the core features that most strongly 
influence the state’s capacity to mobilise and use resources for poverty 
reduction. They include:  
 
•  Control of territory 
•  Ability to provide security 
•  Administrative capacity to implement socio-technical programmes 
•  Effective delimitations of political power 
•  Capacity in basic macro-economic functions 
•  Capacity to deliver basic services to citizens 
 
 What measures could capture these? One set of measures revolves 
around the financial resources available to the state (including its capacity 
to extract them) and a second one looks at the human and technical 
capability to use them. On the financial side, tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP is an obvious choice, although this measure is not immune from 
willingness bias. On a more general financial and security level we try 
several indicators that include Real GDP per capita (purchasing power 
parity).  Apart from the individual variable measurements, a few of the 
composite variables such as government effectiveness (GE) from the 
World Bank, and the Bertelmanns Management Index, and the Purdue 
Terror Scale were tested (although the last two were discarded).  We 
opted to construct a simple replacement indicator composed of objective 
variables most notably because it is impossible to unpack an index with 
many components and identify which component can be affected by a 
policy change. The variables that were chosen and their rationale with the 
above objectives for measuring capacity are listed below
4. 
 
•  Tax as a percentage of GDP: Originally, World Bank tax data were 
used, but its drawback is uneven coverage in terms of countries, so 
data from the IMF Article IV reports, which has better coverage, were 
also included. 
•  GE Government Effectiveness: These data are one of the six 
dimensions of governance developed by the World Bank, each of them 
an aggregate of multiple weighted variables.  Government 
effectiveness is comprised of elements meant to capture the quality of 
public service provision, an important component of good governance 
to most governmental organizations including the MCA. 
•  Real GDP per Capita: This variable is widely available, is comparable 
between countries (purchasing power parity) and is a variable that the 
literature proves to be highly connected with security (Fearon and Laitin 
2003).  
•  POLCON V.  POLCON is an objectively constructed indicator 
measuring institutional constraints on the government. Henisz (2004) 
 
4 For a more detailed discussion of data sources, please see Annex 1. 
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maintains that this indicator measures institutional robustness against 
shocks that destabilize reform processes (Collier 2002). Similar 
POLITY Database measures (notably Political Competitiona and 
Participation) were discarded as they are based on subjective 
assessments by experts. 
•  FDI Stock per GDP: Measures the impact of foreign versus local power 
– the degree of the country’s autonomy.  (De Soysa and Wagner 
2003). 
• Fertility  Rate:  Fertility Rate is a widely available variable. This variable 
is extensively studied in the growth literature and is a good proxy for 
the effectiveness of education and equality policies as well as a social 
capital indicator (Feng, Kugler and Zak 2000; Kremer and Chen 2002). 
Kremer maintains that temporarily increasing access to educational 
opportunities could permanently reduce inequality (2002).  We inverse 
this indicator (1-x) so that the smaller number of births show greater 
development, better education, more social capital and/or better 
equality. 
•  Phones and Mobiles per 1000 population:  This variable is available for 
144 countries and though it is fairly correlated (.74) with GDP per 
capita, however it varies independently. Factor analysis showed this 
variable to not be unique from LN Real GDP per Capita.  Though we 
do not use the literature for this, we reason that this variable is a good 
proxy for certain social and technical advancements. 
•  % of Females in all government ministries (or in economic ministries or 
social ministry positions): Literature shows that involvement of women 
in governing indicates lowering of corruption and decrease in violence 
(Caprioli, 2000, Knack and Azfar 2002). Furthermore, Grootaert and 
Van Bastelaer (2002) claim that ‘women and their associations were 
found to be consistent diffusers of information and technology, and able 
to tap into and generate social capital’
5. Aid and US state department 
literature show increasing importance of women’s measures in 
assessing development and stability.   
•  CIM (Contract Intensive Money): A measure of the level of money 
supply that exists outside of traditional institutions such as banks.  This 
has been used as a proxy for ‘rule of law’, but is perhaps a better 




                                           
 On the basis of what criteria should proxies for capacity be used? 
•  Objective indicators preferred 
•  Sensitive to political change 
•  Discriminating 
•  Data available for many countries 
•  Autonomous of particular political ideologies or institutional 
configurations  
 
5 Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002), 15. 
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16. The figure above shows several countries plotted on the capacity axis. 
After testing many possible measures (see Annex 1, 2 for a list of some of 
the variables tested), individually and grouped, we chose several 
combination indicators – since none of the individual variables 
differentiated the countries adequately (see Annex 3 for examples using 
Tax Revenue as % of GDP and RPC). These indicators are compared to 
some of the widely used and publicly available aggregate indicators such 
as Freedom House’s Political Rights Index (which we reversed and 
standardized so that the higher number shows greater rights), the United 
Nation’s Human Development Index (UNHDI) and the Government 
Effectiveness Index (both standardized between zero and one as 
compared to the other 146 countries under consideration).  Our Capacity 
14 measure correlated with UNHDI at 0.80 using only 4 objective 
measures, and our Capacity 12 index correlated at 0.79 with UNHDI and 
0.60 with TPI’s Corruption Perception Index.  The following variables (only 
a few of the multiple indexes derived and tested) were combined using an 
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additive method.  No weights were used for the aggregation.
6  
Theoretically, the individual variables are considered (as previously 
mentioned), but not in the aggregate.  Only countries where all of the 
variables were available were retained thus no weights for missing data, or 
uncertain data were derived.
7 
 
•  Capacity 3: A simple combination of the natural log of the Real GDP 
per capita standardized between countries and the inverse of the 
fertility rate, also standardized.   
•  Capacity 12: (combination of 5 variables) LN Real GDP per Capita, 
POLCON V, Inverse of the Fertility Rate, FDI Stock/GDP, Phones 
Mobiles per 1000 population. 
•  Capacity 14: (Combination of 4 variables) LN Real GDP per Capita, 
Inverse of the Fertility Rate, FDI Stock/GDP, Phones Mobiles per 1000 
Population.   
•  Capacity 19: (combination of 4 variables) LN Real GDP per Capita, 
POLCON V, Inverse of the Fertility Rate, FDI Stock/GDP. 
•  Capacity 22: (combination of 5 variables) LN Real GDP per Capita, 
POLCON V, Inverse of the Fertility Rate, FDI Stock/GDP, CIM. 




                                           
 Additional measures considered. These were also tested as proxies for 
capacity but were discarded for a variety of reasons. 
 
•  Infant and child mortality. According to the Political Instability Task 
Force, infant mortality (children under 1) is a better predictor of state 
weakness and failure than child mortality (children under 5)
8. Both tend 
to be closely correlated to access to water, which in itself is a good 
indicator to distinguish the bottom two quintiles. 
•  Improved access to water. Has good data availability for 125 countries, 
better than for access to sanitation facilities. 
•  Polity IV measure of stability. Methodological problems in combining 
with other measures (distortion). 
•  RPC (Relative Political Capacity): Greater extractive capacity enables 
funnelling of resources to development if willingness is present. This 
 
6 The individual objective measures (as well as GE) were standardized among the available 
countries (out of the initial 146) for each variable, added then re-standardized in the 
aggregate.  They were not weighted for the missing countries.  No country was included if one 
of the chosen component variables was missing.  If the indicators are found to be extremely 
useful over time, slightly more refined methods for weighting and aggregating should be 
derived. 
7 The individual variables ranged from 2000-2003.  % Females in the divided sectors were 
available from UN Women in Statistics up to 1998.  The standard indexes such as FH, we 
obtained the latest possible version, usually 2003. 
8 For a discussion, see Goldstone et al (2000). 
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did not provide the differentiation desired when combined with the 
willingness variable and at present has too few data points. This could 
be expanded considering it is a simple formula involving agriculture, 
exports, and manufacturing – currently fairly widely available data. 
•  Internet Users per 1000 population: This indicator is a good objective 
indicator of transparency – it is correlated at 0.74 to Transparency 
International’s CPI. However, the coverage is not as great as the 
Phones and Mobile Phones per 1000.   
•  OPEN:  Degree of trade openness also a good indicator of state 
capacity as discovered by the Political Instability Task Force. 
•  FDI per Capita: Originally hypothesized to be a good transparency/rule 
of law indicator.  However, De Soysa (2003) suggests FDI stock per 
GDP as a better capacity measure covering strength of local autonomy 
to foreign and a measure for globalization. 
 




 What are we trying to find proxies for? Although the word ‘willingness’ 
seems to somehow imply that those in power have a straightforward 
choice or decision about implementing policy goals, there may be complex 
social and political factors at work. Good policies often make bad politics. 
Political will to reduce poverty at the apex of government may be frustrated 
by local officials who lack the will to implement policies that run counter to 
their personal interests.  So too rulers who see the long-term value of pro-
poor policy choices may be nevertheless be deterred by the short-term 
need to maintain political support among client groups. When assessing 
the willingness of a state to engage in partnerships for poverty reduction, 
we are specifically looking at two closely related notions. The first one is 
commitment: whether or not there is an explicit political statement that 
signifies an obligation or a promise to reduce poverty. The second one is 
inclusiveness: whether or not the political commitment to development and 
poverty reduction is in fact for all populations and social groups in a 
country. More specifically, we are trying to measure:  
 
•  Explicit commitment to a poverty reduction goal 
•  Credible strategy for poverty reduction 
•  Strategy reflected in outputs and outcomes 
•  Policies and programmes are inclusive of all groups 
•  Partnership: open to the possibility of working with international 
actors (donors, NGOs, etc) to achieve poverty reduction goals 
 
 What measures could capture these? The perfect measure of willingness 
would be observed decisions by policymakers with regard to poverty 
reduction. But since we cannot observe this in any meaningful way that will 
enable large-scale, cross-country comparisons, we need proxies. To be 
suitable, these must be: a) largely the result of political decisions (not 
subject to exogenous influences), and b) occur in a reasonable short time 
frame from when the decision is made. Public spending patterns are ideal 
Working Paper for Discussion Only – NOT UK GOVERNMENT POLICY    12Measuring Capacity and Willingness in Difficult Environments    
for this, on both counts. Spending on health and education are obvious 
pro-poor spending choices, particularly on primary-level services since 
these are of most interest to the poor. If the measures are a share of GDP, 
this would capture not only the allocation within the resource constraint but 
would also pick up tax effort (or lack of). Ratios of education spending to 
GDP are themselves a composite of: a) the state’s efforts to collect taxes, 
and b) the preferences in allocation across sectors. But we must also be 
realistic about the scope of political discretion in developing countries, 
since the first call on public finances is usually debt servicing. An ideal 
measure would be primary level sector expenditure (depending on 
availability of data) as a share of aggregate public expenditure net of debt 




                                           
 A measure that has increasing attention as an outcome indicator sensitive 
to policy change is Female/Male Life expectancy. This ratio is unusual in 
that as countries prosper and improve in health care, men’s mortality 
declines less in comparison to women’s. In other words, as countries 
develop the gap between men and women increases.  his variable is 
objective and widely available for all countries.  
 
 The willingness measure indeed proved to be a much more difficult 
measure to capture conceptually and actually. The individual variables for 
the composites are as follows: 
 
•  Public Health Spending as ratio of the Tax/GDP ratio: The reasoning 
behind this variable is that the state is willing to spend a greater 
amount of tax resources on health rather than redistribution of donor 
funds. 
•  Rate of Immunisation: This variable is extensively reported, has wide 
country coverage and is both sensitive to policy and variable over time. 
•  Voice and Accountability: A composite sub-indicator from the World 
Bank’s aggregate governance indicators.  These measures are 
aggregate measures that are not entirely objective.  
•  Public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The education 
expenditure is not as widely available as other measures, which is why 
fertility rate was instead used as a proxy for education. 
•  Female/Male Life expectancy ratio: As countries prosper, studies 
consistently show that male mortality declines less than female 
mortality.
9  Therefore, this ratio can be an interesting proxy for 
willingness, particularly for inclusiveness and commitment to 
development. 
•  % Women in all Governmental Ministry Offices: This paper introduces 
the notion that nation states with higher number of women in 
government ministry offices might be a higher indication of willingness 
for development, and Knack and Azfar (2002) claim that there is a 
lower likelihood of corruption among females. 
 
9 WHO press release 4 June, 2000  
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22. On the basis of what criteria should proxies for willingness be used? 
 
•  Objective indicators preferred 
•  Sensitive to political change 
•  Data available for many countries 
•  Free of explicit political bias 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of data on Y axis 
 
Yaxis Will 6 Will 7 Will 10 Will 15 V & A IMZ FMLexp
1.0  Slovenia  Belarus
 Belarus  Slovenia
0.9  Slovenia Belarus
0.8 Jamaica  Jamaica
Jamaica  Bhutan
0.7  Slovenia Slovenia  Slovenia  Paraguay
Jamaica  Jamaica Belarus  Uganda
0.6 Uganda  Belarus Paraguay
 Jamaica  Paraguay Bhutan
0.5  Paraguay  Belarus  Uganda Uganda Paraguay Slovenia
 Bhutan Bhutan  Bolivia Cambodia
0.4  Bhutan Cambodia  Uganda Paraguay
 Uganda  Cote d'Iv Cambodia
0.3  Cambodia  Cote d'Iv Cote d'Iv  Cambodia Jamaica
 Cote d'Iv Bhutan Bhutan
0.2  Belarus  DRC  DRC
 DRC  Cote d'Ivoi
0.1  Cote d'Iv  DRC Cote d'Iv
Uganda
0.0




 Nigeria  Nigeria  Nigeria
 
23.
                                           
 The figure above shows several countries plotted on the willingness axis. 
The combination of the World Bank Indicator of Voice and Accountability 
(V & A) and the rate of immunisation seems to provide a good balance of 
objective-subjective measures. Immunisation has been shown to be 
slightly higher in autocratic regimes, whereas the ‘voice and accountability’ 
index is heavily tilted towards liberal democratic values
10. Additionally, 
using the rate of immunisation as a proxy has several advantages
11: a) it is 
highly time-sensitive (effects of immunisation policies can be appreciated 
in short term); b) it is politically un-contentious for any type of regime 
interested in the welfare of its people; c) there is reliable data for most 
 
10 Objective measures of accountability are an important component of the Stability Pact Anti-
Corruption Initiative (SPAI).  This initiative outlines an agenda for reforms in South Eastern 
Europe. See: http://www.stabilitypact.org/anticorruption/default.asp  
11 See Gauri, V. and P. Khaleghian (2002) 
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countries, as well as sub-national data; d) it can serve as a proxy for 
openness to engage with donors, as most immunisation interventions 
involve international, bilateral or NGO agencies. The rate of immunisation 
is also being used as an indicator for the Millennium Challenge Account. 
The other composite variables for willingness are as follows: 
 
•  Willingness 6:  Rate of Immunisation and Female/Male Life expectancy 
ratios added and standardized. 
•  Willingness 7: Rate of Immunisation, the Ratio of Public Health 
Spending per GDP divided by Tax per GDP, and the percent of 
Females in Government Ministry Offices. 
•  Willingness 10: Rate of Immunisation and percent of Females in 
Government Ministry Offices. 





 Additional measures considered. These were also tested as proxies for 
willingness but were discarded for a variety of reasons: 
 
•  Percentage of Government Spending on Social Services: The most 
recent data available was six years old. 
•  Percentage of Government Spend on Education: The data set 
available is missing too many data points to use.  
•  Gini and Education Gini Indexes: Measures of income and educational 
inequality were initially considered a good proxy for government 
willingness. However, these types of measures are the result of 
decisions made a long time ago. Additionally, the education Gini does 
not have great coverage so it was not used in constructing the indexes. 
•  Literacy Rate: An indicator measuring literacy in adults aged 15 and 
over inevitably will not be responsive to current government 
willingness. 
•  Public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The data set 
available is missing too many data points to use.  
•  NGO’s per million population. This variable was debated as to whether 
it showed willingness of donors and others to cooperate with non-state 
actors vs. unwillingness of a particular government to expend revenues 
for development. The coverage was more limited than some of the 
other indicators. 
 
V.  Two composite indexes of capacity-willingness 
 
 Out of a total of 23 possible combined capacity and 15 possible combined 
willingness indexes tested, this paper examines two sets of composite 
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indexes in more depth
12. We do not propose that either of these two sets 
should be considered the only quantitative bar by which to measure a 
state’s fragility. But for our purposes, these indexes provided the 
opportunity to quantify capacity and willingness through: a) simply 
constructed indicators consisting of objective variables that have been 
previously assessed in academic literature; b) include good proxies 
because of reasonable availability of data, the differentiation they afford 






                                           
 The two combined indexes for capacity are: State Capacity 19
13 and Tax 
and Government Effectiveness. The primary measure forming the matrix 
of capacity is the constraints on the government indicating checks and 
balances.  This political measure (POLCON V) is an objective one.  
Generally, liberal democracy would be the desired institutional 
arrangement for advancement, however empirical evidence shows that 
until democracy is well embedded (Hegre et al, 2001 and Reynal-Querol, 
2002) - conflict and insecurity are major hazards.  Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith (2004) devise a formal model showing that the US is more likely to 
give aid to countries where there are few constraints and the power is in 
the hands of a few that can be ‘compelled’ to carry out specific policies.  
Though it may not be the overall goal of development, it might be more 
efficacious in the long run to have fewer constraints, and countries 
undergoing transitions from autocracies to embedded democracies will 
have the further hazard of instability and political conflict.  
 
 As previously mentioned, a great deal of research has been done on 
fertility rates and growth; alternately causal and consequences of a 
‘poverty trap’ (Feng, Kugler, and Zak 2000).  Lower fertility rates are highly 
indicative of social capital advancement.  The measure is accurate, 
objective and widely available. If what Kremer (2003) claims from his 
empirical work is true, then temporarily increasing access to educational 
opportunities might permanently reduce inequality. 
 
 A third primary component of the capacity indicator chosen is FDI inward 
stocks per GDP.  This objective measure not only indicates degree of 
transparency and stability that enables investment, but measures the 
control the central government has over a country’s financial resources.  
Certainly countries with low stability and no rule of law will have little 
foreign investment, however, a high level of FDI stocks to GDP shows that 
the financial resources are not entirely in the hands of the home 
government. De Soysa and Wagner use this measure and openness of 
trade to show that globalisation does not cause conflict or inhibit 
development.   
 
 Lastly, GDP per capita is an obvious measure for advancement and 
financial aspects of a society that is concrete and affected by policy. The 
measure that closely follows this and can capture technological 
 
12 For a complete listing of all composite indexes see Annex 3. 
13  Which include POLCON, fertility rates, FDI per GDP and GDP per capita. 
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advancement is number of phones and mobiles per 1000 populations and 
should be further explored as a proxy for advancement in overall 
prosperity and in technical innovation.  Though one of the indexes 
(Capacity 12, Figure 9) adds this measure to the above mentioned four 
variables, it does not particularly add to the information when with GDP 
per capita. Though correlation and Spearman tests showed the measures 
to vary independently, factor analysis and principal components analysis 





                                           
 The Contract Intensive Money measure (Clague et al 1999) was also 
incorporated in the Capacity 22 index (Figure 10, Annex 3).  This could 
conceivable improve the differentiation between the more advance 
countries in the ‘high capacity/high willingness quadrant. The alternate 
completely objective measure to government structural constraints is the 
Data Base for Political Institutions from the World Bank (Beck et al 2001), 
though this measure contains 100 variables, certain components might be 
unpacked to test for capacity.  Institutional measures such as this one 
might be explored as willingness measures as well in the sense of 
liberalizing institutions and sharing wealth.  
 
 In terms of the willingness indexes this paper discusses two in depth, one 
is Government Willingness 10
14 and the other is a combination of 
Immunisation rates and the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability. Our 
research into good proxies for willingness has taken us to the discussion 
around the role of women in government.  If nascent research indicates 
that corruption is less acceptable to females and that women leaders are 
less likely to opt for violence (though research shows that in more equal 
societies, both males and females are less likely to choose political 
violence), then governments can legislate mandatory quotas. In an IRIS 
study, Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002: p. 15) conclude that ‘women 
and their associations were found to be consistent diffusers of information 
and technology, and able to tap into and generate social capital.’ 
Measures of women’s roles in society are increasingly shown to be 
important as baseline development indicators by government and non-
governmental organizations (Cheema and Maguire, 2001). 
 
 One of the most interesting and widely available measures is the life 
expectancy ratio.  When combined with Immunisation rates (IMZ) this 
measure differentiates between countries very well. Studies by the World 
Health Organization show that the gap between female and male life 
expectancy widens as countries develop because men’s mortality rates 
decline more slowly than women’s. However, anomalies in the African 
nations and places like the former Soviet countries occur due to such 
factors as high alcohol related deaths among younger men and AIDS 
which affect males most prominently giving a false picture of 
advancement.  In these cases, the opposite ratio (Male/Female Life 
Expectancy) might be indicative of advancement in the mental and 
physical health arenas, and in jobs for the men.   
 
14 Comprised of immunisation rates and the percentage of women in government. 




 Alternately, health care spending per tax when combined with 
immunisation rates also differentiate between nations and the overall 
percentage of women in ministerial positions distinguishes well between 
countries as shown in Figure 8, Annex 3.  Social spending is a direct result 
of government policy as are immunisation rates. 
 
 Precisely why women in power could indicate more secure, transparent 
and socially advanced societies is a subject still under debate and only 
recently being explored on a more systematic and scientific basis.  The 
purpose of this exercise was to identify objective, unbiased measures that 
can distinctly differentiate between developing countries, are widely 
available, sensitive to policy and vary quickly over time.  Figures 6 and 8, 
show that these objective indicators do illustrate change.
15  Theoretical 
and empirical studies show what policies affect each of these individual 
indicators that combine to form our simple capacity and willingness 
measures.  An infinite number of combinations of the individual variables 
are possible after factor analysis, principal component tests, and 
correlation tests are performed to determine if the measure combined are 
in fact measuring different aspects of development.  Only a few of the 
graphs of some forty different composite measures are shown here.  The 
final choice is a subjective one from the area experts who understand 
logically in which quadrant each of the measured states should fall. 
 
 


























































































































































                                            
15 The 1995 composite measures are exclusively from 1995, however, the 2000 measures 
actually have some measures from 2001-3.  These composite should be more precisely 
matched, though we originally wanted the latest ones available. 
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35. Figure 4 shows a logical distribution of countries resting above and below 
the median levels (indicated by the cross hair lines) and well differentiated. 
Some of the better performing countries are shown in blue and the poor 
performers are show in red as in Figure 6.  The indicators for willingness 
are variables sensitive to policy (Immunisation and % Women in 
Government Ministry), the capacity measure can at minimum show 
change over short time-periods as indicated in Figure 5 as well as point to 
specific areas needing attention such as social capital or investment. 
Kremer (2002) claims that temporarily providing access to educational 
opportunities can permanently reduce inequality.  Kremer and Feng, 
Kugler and Zak (2000) show that higher educated individuals have fewer 
children who in turn are also likely to be better educated.   
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36. Figure 5 shows the change over time.  From 1995-2000, Zimbabwe takes 
a hit in both the capacity and willingness arenas.  The simpler measure in 
the Annex 3 (Figure 8) comprised of only two measures for capacity and 
two for willingness also show Zimbabwe’s demise over a five-year period.  
Also striking is Nepal’s precipitous fall in Figure 8.  Figure 5 (the more 
complex measures) shows a more subtle change in Nepal, with a 
decrease in capacity, but a slight increase in willingness. Uganda 
improves almost to the median for capacity and into a new quadrant past 
the median for willingness (cross hairs are median values for all countries 
for the year 2000, the x and y axis are standardized 0-1). Examination of 
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the countries individually from the practitioners’ vantages can tease out the 
logic of the measures.  
 
 
Figure 6: Tax and Government Effectiveness vs. 






























































































































































                                           
 An alternative combination of composite indexes, with immunisation, voice 
and accountability in the willingness axis, and tax and government 
effectiveness in as proxies of capacity, is shown in Figure 6 above. The 
above country codes in red signal those that are normally considered 
fragile states, whereas those in blue are considered ‘good performers’ by 
the international community. The lines indicate the medians. The voice 
and accountability aggregate indicator overwhelmingly looks at political 
and civil rights, representation and political systems. There is only a single 
component that assesses ‘democratic accountability’ but bases it on the 
likelihood that a government will fall, peacefully or violently. So 
accountability is here understood as the frequency of regime change. The 
aggregate indicator on government effectiveness is very focused on policy 
and bureaucratic capacity. An interesting measure is that of ‘institutional 
failure’ or a deterioration of government capacity to cope with national 
problems as a result of institutional rigidity that reduces GDP growth rate 
by 1% during any 12-month period. It also includes a couple of interesting 
measures under non-representative sources that look at the 
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16 For a detailed discussion of the composite measures of both Voice and Accountability and 










                                           
 Social scientists have come up with a wide array of quantitative indicators 
to try to measure variations in state capabilities
17, but this type of exercise 
is plagued with three main difficulties: a) most aggregate figures used tell 
more about the assignment of resources than their actual use, b) many 
indicators do not distinguish effectively between social and material 
resources and state abilities to extract or use those resources, c) most 
quantitative measures of state capacity fail to assess other elements of 
social control such as participation and autonomy. It is therefore very 
important to understand the political economy reasons behind capacity 
problems and some of the contextual difficulties faced by difficult 
environments. 
 
 The indicators proposed offer some insights into the nature of policy 
prescriptions that promote good performance by highlighting key 
problematic areas, either on the willingness or capacity side.  Moreover, 
each of the indicators are objectively measured and not subject to possible 
bias or moral hazard.  
 
 An additional line of inquiry would be to test the predictive values of the 
indices described here. Pulling the data together for a few more years over 
time would likely allow that.  If aid were to be used as the independent 
variable, Brautigam and Knack (2004) have done some interesting work. 
Also, work in progress by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show that the 
element of political discretion (both from donors and recipient countries) 
limits the predictive power of certain variables.   
 
State strength is a complex, multifaceted concept that involves political 
motivation as well as institutional capacity. Fragility is an evolving quality 
and cannot be meaningfully assessed independent of context and the 
dynamics of society-state relations. Therefore it seems necessary to delve 
deeper into the notion of context and a more differentiated typology for 
more effective policy responses. The measurement approach presented 
here is intended as a tool to inform decision-making on responses to 
difficult environments for better poverty reduction outcomes. Such 
measures are not intended to form a list of difficult environments. Other 







17 Several authors have attempted to operationalise the notion of state capacity as the ratio 
between actual extraction and expected extraction. For a discussion see Migdal (1988), 283.  
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ANNEX 1: SOURCES OF DATA  
 
Indicator [CODE]  Period  N/146  Source  Notes on data  
% Female in All 
Government  Ministry  
Offices [%FnGovALL] 
 
1998 132  UN  WISTATS 
United Nations Women’s 
Indicators and Statistics 
Data Base 
Theoretically, greater female representation in higher offices decreases interstate 
conflict levels/likelihood. Advancement of perhaps other sorts? Soft power? 
Mary Caprioli, (2000) ‘Gendered Conflict,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol 37, no. 
1, 53-68 
Patrick Regan and Aida Paskeviciute, ‘Women’s Access to Politics and Peaceful 
States,’ Journal of Peace Research (2003), Vol 40, No. 3, 287-302 
Knack et al, also maintain this is a good measure of corruption.  Lower corruption 
among females.  This could be temporary…. Of course. 
% Female in Economic 
Ministry  Offices 
[%FnEconGov] 
 
1998  132  UN WISTATS  Cheema and Maguire (2001) ‘Governance for Human Development: The Role of 
External Partners’, Public Admin. Dev. 21:201-209, suggest women in office, 
voting, etc. as quantitative baseline and development indicators. 




1998  132  UN WISTATS  IRIS study: Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002) ‘Understanding and Measuring 
Social Capital’ – “Women and their associations were found to be consistent 
diffusers of information and technology, and able to tap into and generate social 
capital.” p. 15 
% immunisation coverage 
[IMZs2003] 




A mean for each country was taken of estimated % coverage for the DTP 
(Diphtheria, Tetanus and Pertussis), MCV (Measles) and Pol 3 (Polio) vaccines.  In 
all cases the mean was based on estimates for all three vaccines. Access dataset 
at: http://www.who.int/vaccines-surveillance/DataTable.htm 




71    UNDP  Human
Development Indicators 
2004.  See: 
http://hdr.undp.org/statisti
cs/data/ 
Includes both capital expenditures (spending on construction, renovation, major 
repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and current expenditures 
(spending on goods and services that are consumed within the current year and 
would need to be renewed the following year). It covers such expenditures as staff 
salaries and benefits, contracted or purchased services, books and teaching 
materials, welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, 
rents, telecommunications and travel. 
% of Government spend 
on social services 
1998  48  WDI 2000: International 
Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and 
data files, and World 
Social Services refers to education, health, social security, welfare, housing and 
community amenities.  It also covers compensation for loss of income to the sick 
and temporarily disabled; payments to the elderly, the permanently disabled, and 
the unemployed; family, maternity, and child allowances; and the cost of welfare 
services such as care of the aged, the disabled, and the children.  Expenditures 
Working Paper for Discussion Only – NOT UK GOVERNMENT POLICY    25 Measuring Capacity and Willingness in Difficult Environments – Annex 1 
Bank and OECD GDP 
estimates. 
relevant to environmental protection are included indistinguishably in this category. 
% of total population with 
access to an improved 
water source [WaterTP%] 
2000      125 WDI:  World  Health
Organization and United 
Nations Children's Fund, 
Global Water Supply and 
Sanitation Assessment 
2000 Report. 
Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population 
with reasonable access to an adequate amount of water from an improved source, 
such as a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or 
spring, and rainwater collection. Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker 
trucks, and unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the 
availability of at least 20 litres a person a day from a source within one kilometre of 
the dwelling. 
Child Mortality Rate 
[CMR] 
2002      146 UNSD  Millennium
Indicators database: 
United Nations Children’s 
Fund, State of the 
World’s Children Report 
2004  
Child Mortality rate is the number of children per 1000 live births who will die 
before their fifth birthday.  Note: ‘a country’s infant mortality rate provides a 
sensitive indicator of broader changes in economic development and material well-
being.  The forces to which infant mortality rates appear to be sensitive include the 
quality of a country’s medical and public health systems, levels of maternal ad 
infant nutrition, access to shelter and clean drinking water, and levels of education 
and literacy.’ From State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings. 




2000  130  IFS/ WDI   (M2-C)/M2 : Used as a proxy for rule of law in theory, but in fact could measure 
strength of institutions more generally.  
CLAGUE, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson (1999)  
‘Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and  
Economic Performance,’ Journal of Economic Growth, 4: 185-211. 
 







122    World  Resources
WDI 
 
Data Collected through the World Resources Institute for 1998-2000 for FDI from 
World Bank, SIPRI, UN Conf. On Trade and Dev., and ISO 
http://pubs.wri.org/datasets.cfm?SortBy=1  Macro/Transparency 
FDI Stock per GDP 
Standardized 
[FDIinStock/GDPs] 
2000    139 UNCTAD  De Soysa and Wagner claim that FDI relative to local economic activity is a good 
gauge of the relative impact of foreign versus domestic power.   De SOYSA, 
Indra and Angelika Wagner, (2003) ‘Global Market, Local Mayhem? 
Foreign Investment, Trade Openness, State Capacity, and Civil War, 1989-
2000, International Development Research Center (IDRC) Paper 
http://www.dgroups.org/groups/globalization/docs/JCR-5-3-03.pdf 
Female/Male Life 
Expectancy Ratio [MflEx] 
- standardised [FMLexps] 
200      145 WDI World Health Organization. ‘Studies have shown consistently that as countries get 
richer, male mortality tends to decline less than female mortality. This WHO study 
shows that the same patterns hold when healthy life expectancies are measured.’ 
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- normalised [FMLexpN]  http://www.who.int/inf-pr-2000/en/pr2000-life.html 
Gini Index [Gini]    98  WDI: World Bank staff 
estimates based on 
primary household survey 
data obtained from 
government statistical 
agencies and World Bank 
country departments. 
Data for high-income 
economies are from the 
Luxembourg Income 
Study database. 
Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some 
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the 
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of 
recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute 
equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 






146  World Bank Governance 
Indicators (KKZ) 
Includes rankings from five sources: State Failure Task Force, Global Insight, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services, and World Markets Online. 
Additionally it includes the following non-representative sources: Afrobarometer, 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, Business 
Environment, Risk Intelligence, Freedom House, World Economic Forum, 
Latinobarometro and Institute for Management Development. 




Natural Commodity Exports divided by Total Exports. See Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004). 








2000  104  World Resources Institute  Data Collected through the World Resources Institute for 1998-2000 for FDI from 
World Bank, SIPRI, UN Conf. On Trade and Dev., and ISO 
http://pubs.wri.org/datasets.cfm?SortBy=1  Technological Advancement 
This variable has high correlation with CPI.  Also, greater number of governmental 
websites per country indicates greater openness/transparency.  Such things as 
GDP per capita and FDI/GDP contribute to these web indicators. La Porte, 
Demchak, and De Jong, (2002) ‘Democracy, Bureaucracy in the Age of the Web 
Empirical Findings and Theoretical Speculations’, Administration and Society 34 
(4): 441-446 
Inverse of the Fertility 
Rate [InFerRates2000] 
 
2000      143 WDI
(This was inversed and  
standardized so that 
higher value indicates 
Proxy for Poverty Trap, and Higher Education <-> lower fertility rate.  This seems 
to be an extremely good proxy for education dispersion and development 
Yi Feng, Jacek Kugler and Paul J. Zak (2000)  ‘The Politics of Fertility and 
Economic Development,’ International Studies Quarterly 44, 667-693 
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greater capacity)  Michael Kremer and Daniel Chen (2002) ‘Income Distribution Dynamics with 
Endogenous Fertility,’ Journal of Economic Growth, 7, 227-258 




104  WDI: United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics. 
Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with 
understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. 
Natural Log Real GDP 




2000    144 PWT 
WDI 
CIA 
Simple proxy for security.  Literature shows that as countries more prosperous, all 
types of internal conflicts are less likely.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) ‘Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War,’ American Political Science Review 97 (1): 1-16. 
NGO’s per Million 
Population [NGO2000s] 
2000  123  World Resources Institute  Data Collected through the World Resources Institute for 1998-2000 for FDI from 
World Bank, SIPRI, UN Conf. On Trade and Dev., and ISO 
http://pubs.wri.org/datasets.cfm?SortBy=1 
Open [OpenS2000]  2000  115  Penn World Tables  State Failure Task Force Results: Degree of Trade Openness. 
Phones and Mobile 
Phones per 10000 
population 
[PhonMob2002S] 
2002    144 WDI   
Standardized  
Correlated to GDP per Capita, but varies independently.  Do not have literature on 
this yet.  Use as technological penetration/openness. 
High coverage. 
POLCON III and 




172  Henisz (2004)  Panel dataset containing information on nine different fiscal policies including three 
subcategories of expenditure (goods and services, subsidies, and capital 
expenditure) and six subcategories of revenue (non-tax, taxes on goods and 
services, taxes on capital and profits, taxes on trade, social security taxes, and 
other taxes) all normalized by a country’s level of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Public Education 







and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics. 
Public expenditure on education consists of public spending on public education 
plus subsidies to private education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. 
Public Health 
Expenditure / TaxGDP 
[Ph/TGDPs] 
2002  133  WDI  Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from 
government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including 
donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and 
social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. 
Public Health per  2001  128  WDI   Public expenditure management as part of good governance. 
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GDP/Tax per GDP  Grindle, Merilee (2002) ‘Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and 





83  Claremont/NSF  A measure of states ability to extract resources – predicted revenues over actually 
tax revenues. 
Relative Political Capacity, Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler (eds.), Political 
Capacity and economic Behavior (Boulder, 1997): Yi Feng, Jacek Kugler and Paul 
J. Zak, "The Politics of Fertility and Economic Development," International Studies 
Quarterly (2000) 44, 667-693 . 




66    WDI:  International
Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and 
data files, and World 
Bank and OECD GDP 
estimates. 
Tax revenue comprises compulsory transfers to the central government for public 
purposes. Compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social security 
contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax 
revenue are treated as negative revenue. Data are shown for central government 
only.  Data used is most recent available between 2000-2002. 




146  World Bank Governance 
Indicators (KKZ) 
Looks at political and civil rights, representativeness and the level of democracy in 
political systems. Source include State Failure Task Force, Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Freedom House, Human Rights Database, Political Risk Services, Reporters 
Without Borders, World Markets Online. Non-representative sources include: 
Afrobarometer, Freedom House, Gallup, World Economic Forum, Latinobarometro, 
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The data for each indicator were standardised using the following formula to give 
values within the range 0 – 1, where the lowest value in the data set is 0 and the 
largest is 1. 
  
Standardised Value = (Raw Value – b) 
               (a - b)       
 
Where: a = Highest Value in Data Set 
    b = Lowest Value in Data Set 
   
 
Y-Axis: Willingness  X-Axis: Capacity 
   
•  Mean Immunisation coverage for 
DTP, MCV and Pol3 vaccines 
•  Tax revenue as percentage of 
GDP 
•  Voice and Accountability (KKZ)  •  Percentage of population with 
access to an improved water 
source 
•  Percentage of budget spend on 
Education 
•  Mean Immunisation coverage 
for DTP, MCV and Pol3 
vaccines 
•  Percentage of Government spend 
on social services 
•  Gini Index 
•  Child Mortality Rate   •  Literacy Rate 
•  Likelihood of State Failure 
Event  
•  Public Health Expenditure: 
percentage of GDP 
•  Government Effectiveness 
Index (KKZ) 
•  Public Education Expenditure: 
percentage of GDP 
•  LN Real GDP per Capita  •  Public Health expenditure as 
percentage of Tax/GDP  •  POLCON V (Political 
Constraints)  •  Female/Male Life Expectancy 
•  Inverse of the Fertility Rate  •  NGO’s per Million Population 
•  FDI per Capita  •  % Females in Government Total  
•  FDI Stock per GDP   
•  Open   
•  Greed (Natural commodity 
exports/Total Exports) 
 
•  CIM (Contract Intensive 
Money) 
•  Phones Mobiles per 1000 
population 
•  % Females in Social Ministry 
Offices 
•  % Females in Government 
Total 
•  Relative Political Capacity 
•  Internet Users per 1000 
population 
   
 
 




for Borrowing from 
the World Bank
18 



























CAP Cape  Verde 







DRC Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
CGO Congo,  Rep. 
COS Costa  Rica 
CDI Cote  d'Ivoire 
CRO Croatia 






EGT  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
ELS El  Salvador 
                                     





























ROK Korea,  Rep. 
KYR Kyrgyz  Republic 










































STP  Sao Tome and 
Principe 
SEN Senegal 
SEM Serbia  and 
Montenegro 
SEY Seychelles 
SIL Sierra  Leone 
SLR Slovak  Republic 
SLO Slovenia 
SOL Solomon  Islands 
SOM Somalia 
SAF South  Africa 
SRI Sri  Lanka 
SKN  St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
SLU St.  Lucia 























VEN Venezuela,  RB 
VIE Vietnam 
YEM Yemen,  Rep. 
ZAM Zambia 
ZIM Zimbabwe
Working Paper for Discussion Only – NOT UK GOVERNMENT POLICY    31ng Capacity and Willingness in Difficult Environments – Annex 3 
er for Discussion Only – NOT UK GOVERNMENT POLICY    32 




Capacity  CapS 1 CapS 2 CapS 3 CapS 4  CapS 5 CapS 6 CapS 7 CapS 8  CapS 9 
Security   LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000      LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000
Effec Delim of Pol pwr  PolconV     PolconIII      PolconIII PolconIII PolconV PolconV PolconV






InFerRateS2000    InFerRateS2000
Macro Econ  FDIsPC2000          FDIsPC2000 FDIsPC2000 FDIsPC2000 FDIsPC2000 FDIsPC2000 FDIsPC2000
Soc tec/soc services/Security  %Fn GovALL     %FGovALL %FEconGov %FEconGov  %FGovALL   %FEconGov 
Technological prog           InterUseS2001     InterUseN2001 
Macro Econ        OpenS2000          
Social Programs  FMLexpS2000 FMLexpS2000           
                 
Capacity  CapS 10 CapS 11 CapS 12 CapS 13  CapS 14 CapS 15 CapS 16 CapS 17  CapS 18 
Security   LGDPs2000 LGDPs2000 LGDP2000s LGDP2000s LGDP2000s LGDP2000s LGDP2000s FDInPC2000  InvFerRateN 
Effec Delim of Pol pwr  PolconV PolconV PolconVs PolconVs InFerRateN PolconVs PolconVs BankLRAn2000  %Fn GovALL 
Educ and Soc Capital Proxy  InFerRateS2000 InFerRateS2000 InFerRateN InFerRateN FDIinStock/GD
Ps
InFerRateN InFerRateN InvFerRateN  TaxGDP 






RPCn1995 %Fn GovALL  PolconV 
Soc tec/soc services/Security  %FGovALL    %FEconGov PhonMob2002s PhonMob200
2s 
  InterUseN2001   TaxGDP  LGDPs2000 
Technological prog  %Fn SocGov    Greed   PolconV   
Macro Econ   OpenS2000        LitRate2001-2   LGDP2000s   
Social Programs                TaxGDP
   
Capacity  CapS 19 CapS 20 CapS 21 CapS 22          
Security   LGDP2000s LGDP2000s LGDP2000s LGDP2000s          
Effec Delim of Pol pwr  PolconVs PolconVs PolconVs PolconVs          
Educ and Soc Capital Proxy  InFerRateN InFerRateN InFerRateN InFerRateN          




        
Soc tec/soc services/Security    InterUseN2001 %Fn GovALL  CIM2000s          
Technological prog       
Macro Econ  
Social Programs 
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Willingness  Wills 1 Wills 2 Wills 3 Wills 4  Wills 5 Wills 6 Wills 7 Wills 8  Wills 9 
Care for women  FMLexpS2000 FMLexpS2000 FMLexpN2000    FMLexpS2000 IMZn2003 IMZn2003    PH/TGDPs
Care for children  IMZn2003     IMZn2003 IMZn2003 IMZn2003 PH/TGDPs PH/TGDPs  %Fn  GovALL 
NGOs allowed to operate  NGOn 2000 NGOn 2000    NGOn 2000   %Fn GovALL    
                
  Wills 10  Wills 11 Wills 12 Will 13  Will 14        
  IMZ2003s IMZ2003s IMZ2003s IMZ2003s         PH//TGDP
  %Fn GovALL  FMLexps2000 %Fn EconGov  Mflex          
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rking Paper for Discussion Only – NOT UK GOVERNMENT POLICY 
ANNEX 4: ADDITIONAL GRAPHS AND TABLES 
 
 














































































































































































































  34Measuring Capacity and Willingness in Difficult Environments – Annex 4 
 



























State Capacity 3 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 





FDI per Capita   122 0.117 0.186 0 1 
Fertility Rate  143 0.590 0.274 0 1 
% Fem in Gov All  132 0.309 0.218 0 1 
% Fem in Econ Gv  132 0.259 0.243 0 1 
% Fem in Soc Gv  132 0.277 0.281 0 1 
Tax GDP  129 0.381 0.222 0 1 
Publ Hlth Exp/TxGDP  128 0.377 0.187 0 1 
FDI Stock/GDP  139 0.447 0.126 0 1 
Open 115 0.258 0.171 0 1 
Internet Use per 1000  104 0.075 0.145 0 1 
Phone Mobile per 1000  144 0.181 0.209 0 1 
POLCON V  121 0.323 0.304 0 0.863 
UNHDI 136 0.597 0.263 0 1 
Trans Inter  CPI  107 0.277 0.192 0 1 
Freedom House  144 0.537 0.352 0 1 
Gov. Effectiveness  146 0.492 0.205 0 1 
LN Read GDP per Capita  144 0.550 0.240 0 1 
CIM 129 0.744 0.196 0 1 
Capacity 3  143 0.548 0.224 0 1 
Capacity 19  113 0.511 0.221 0 1 
Capacity 22  108 0.553 0.218 0 1 
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NGO 123 0.150 0.185 0 1 
F/M Life Expectancy  145 0.374 0.168 0 1 
Immunisations 146 0.719 0.272 0 1 
Willingness 6  146 0.512 0.211 0 1 
Willingness 7  116 0.486 0.195 0 1 




Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
FDI  Inv. Fe % Fem% Fem% FemTax GDPbHlth/FDI StoOPEN Intern U Phone POLCO UNHDITPI CP
------------ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
FDI 1.00
Inv. Fert Rate 0.16 1.00
% Fem Gov 0.28 0.18 1.00
% Fem Ec Gv 0.16 0.15 0.67 1.00
% Fem Sc Gv 0.23 0.21 0.60 0.21 1.00
Tax GDP 0.29 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.01 1.00
PbHlth/TxGDP 0.06 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.42 1.00
FDI Stock/GDP 0.61 -0.11 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.38 -0.19 1.00
OPEN 0.23 -0.19 0.24 0.30 0.04 0.48 -0.25 0.46 1.00
Intern Use 0.60 0.02 0.28 0.33 0.14 0.47 -0.02 0.53 0.59 1.00
Phone Mobile 0.64 0.29 0.32 0.47 0.03 0.65 0.03 0.43 0.51 0.75 1.00
POLCON V 0.48 0.08 0.34 0.37 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.28 0.21 0.52 0.52 1.00
U N H D I 0 . 5 80 . 2 50 . 2 00 . 3 4 - 0 . 0 80 . 3 90 . 1 40 . 2 90 . 3 60 . 6 00 . 7 90 . 5 21 . 0 0
T P I  C P I 0 . 4 80 . 2 00 . 2 80 . 1 90 . 1 90 . 4 70 . 0 10 . 4 30 . 4 60 . 7 50 . 6 20 . 3 30 . 5 81 . 0 0
Freedom Hs 0.51 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.37 0.47 0.59 0.38 0.39
GE 0.48 0.10 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.28 -0.07 0.45 0.46 0.58 0.46 0.22 0.36 0.54
LN Real GDPC 0.66 0.26 0.24 0.39 0.00 0.45 0.09 0.38 0.35 0.66 0.82 0.53 0.93 0.58
CIM 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.08 -0.13 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.17 0.26 0.38 0.37 0.56 0.15
c a p s 3 0 . 5 30 . 7 80 . 2 70 . 3 40 . 1 30 . 4 50 . 0 70 . 1 80 . 1 10 . 4 40 . 7 10 . 3 90 . 7 60 . 5 0
caps12 0.68 0.47 0.37 0.46 0.07 0.50 0.02 0.42 0.31 0.67 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.57
caps19 0.65 0.50 0.37 0.43 0.08 0.44 0.02 0.39 0.24 0.62 0.76 0.82 0.78 0.53
caps22 0.63 0.45 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.42 0.03 0.37 0.24 0.61 0.75 0.83 0.80 0.51
N G O 0 . 5 30 . 0 70 . 4 70 . 1 80 . 2 50 . 4 20 . 0 10 . 4 60 . 4 20 . 4 00 . 4 70 . 2 40 . 2 90 . 4 4
F/M life exp 0.45 0.36 0.45 0.44 0.15 0.43 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.49 0.63 0.34 0.56 0.43
IMZ 0.37 0.18 0.07 0.13 -0.13 0.41 0.07 0.23 0.35 0.45 0.56 0.33 0.75 0.57
w i l l s 6 0 . 4 80 . 2 90 . 2 30 . 2 9 - 0 . 0 40 . 5 10 . 1 50 . 2 30 . 3 40 . 5 60 . 7 10 . 4 10 . 8 30 . 6 4
wills7 0.42 0.22 0.47 0.36 0.15 0.22 0.51 0.16 0.23 0.43 0.55 0.38 0.68 0.53
w i l l s 1 0 0 . 4 50 . 2 40 . 6 10 . 4 80 . 2 30 . 5 00 . 0 00 . 3 00 . 4 10 . 5 10 . 6 20 . 4 50 . 7 10 . 6 1
RPC -0.07 0.19 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.45 -0.50 0.10 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.05
FreedoGE LN ReaCIM caps3 caps12caps19caps22NGO F/M lifeIMZ wills6 wills7 wills10
------------ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
Freedom Hs 1.00
GE 0.37 1.00
LN Real GDPC 0.39 0.33 1.00
CIM 0.05 0.21 0.49 1.00
caps3 0.42 0.27 0.81 0.44 1.00
caps12 0.60 0.38 0.86 0.47 0.84 1.00
caps19 0.60 0.34 0.82 0.47 0.84 0.99 1.00
caps22 0.56 0.31 0.83 0.54 0.82 0.98 0.99 1.00
NGO 0.31 0.25 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.39 0.35 0.34 1.00
F/M life exp 0.36 0.18 0.64 0.24 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.32 1.00
IMZ 0.17 0.37 0.64 0.36 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.24 0.27 1.00
wills6 0.28 0.37 0.78 0.39 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.32 0.62 0.92 1.00
wills7 0.34 0.32 0.60 0.34 0.52 0.57 0.54 0.56 0.39 0.52 0.75 0.82 1.00
w i l l s 1 0 0 . 3 40 . 4 20 . 6 50 . 3 10 . 5 70 . 6 50 . 6 20 . 6 30 . 4 50 . 4 60 . 8 30 . 8 60 . 8 61 . 0 0
RPC 0.00 -0.12 0.02 -0.10 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 -0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 